Automatic Teller Machine Robberies: Theories of Liability by Miles, Joan
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 14 | Number 1 Article 3
1986
Automatic Teller Machine Robberies: Theories of
Liability
Joan Miles
Fordham University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joan Miles, Automatic Teller Machine Robberies: Theories of Liability, 14 Fordham Urb. L.J. 171 (1986).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol14/iss1/3
AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE ROBBERIES:
THEORIES OF LIABILITY
I. Introduction
The emergence of the electronic banking age,' while bringing
considerable convenience to the consumer and savings to the banking
industry,2 has created complex legal issues and problems.' One me-
dium of electronic fund transfers (EFT),4 the twenty-four hour au-
tomated teller machine (ATM), has gained nationwide acceptance5
1. See Schroeder, Developments in Consumer Electronic Fund Transfers, 69
FED. RESERVE BULL. 395, 395-97 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Naar
& Stein, EFTS: The Computer Revolution in Electronic Banking, 5 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS AND L. 429-431 (1976).
2. A report by the Federal Reserve Board has described the savings to financial
institutions which have adopted electronic banking services. See Developments, supra
note 1. For example, in 1981, the average cost of processing a check deposited
by mail was 59 cents, while the average cost for preauthorized electronic deposit
was a mere 7 cents. Id. at 395.
A recent article effectively illustrated the benefits of automated teller machines
[ATMs] by making the following comparison:
A human teller can handle up to 200 transactions a day, works 30 hours
a week, gets a salary anywhere from $8,900 to $20,000 a year, plus
fringe benefits, gets coffee breaks, a vacation and sick time.
In contrast, an automated teller machine can handle 2,000 transactions
a day, works 168 hours a week, costs about $22,000 a year to run, and
does not take coffee breaks or vacations. Except for occasional break-
downs, it does not get sick.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1983, at D6, col. 2. Furthermore, ATMs have proved to
be considerable profit-making assets to banks which install them, attracting additional
depositors and thereby increasing profits. For instance, after installing the machines,
Citicorp more than doubled its share of deposits in the New York metropolitan
area from 4.40 in 1977 to 9.6% in June, 1982. Id.
3. For an overview of the legal issues and problems raised by EFT systems,
see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED
STATES: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1-17 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
4. An electronic fund transfer has been defined as "any transfer of funds,
other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument,
which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer
or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to
debit or credit an account." 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1982).
For a description of the various electronic banking services available to the public,
see Horan, Outlook for EFT Technology, in COMPUTERS AND BANKING: ELECTRONIC
FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY 21 (K. Colton and K. Kraemer eds.
1980).
5. The acceptance of ATMs is apparent in light of their rapid proliferation.
One of the first cash machines in the United States was installed in 1969 by
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but simultaneously has generated a wave of new criminal activity. 6
The perpetration of a robbery or assault on a customer immediately
following an ATM withdrawal raises an important legal question:
who should be liable for the attendant loss?7
According to commonly accepted tort principles, an owner is often
held liable for harm to patrons intentionally caused by third parties
on business premises if the owner has failed to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances to protect the patrons.8 For example,
landlords have been held accountable to tenants and guests who
were criminally assaulted in buildings where lack of proper security
was found to be a proximate cause of the injury. 9 However, where
bank customers have been shot during the course of a bank robbery,
Chemical Bank in New York City. See Louderback, Status of EFT: An Assessment
of Services and a Review of EFT in the Fifty States, in COMPUTERS AND BANKING:
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY 39-40 (K. Colton and
K. Kraemer eds. 1980). At the close of 1984, there were more than 58,000 ATMs
in use in the United States which handled a total of 3.91 billion transactions that
year, excluding balance inquiries. Zimmer, A TMs 1984: A Time for Opportunity,
MAG. OF BANK AD., May 1985, at 26. ATM transactions were estimated to account
for $90 billion in withdrawals and $182 billion in deposits in 1984. Id.
6. See 2 J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES § 26:1 (2d ed. 1980)
(impersonal nature of electronic banking transactions renders them vulnerable to
crime); Lipsig, Duty of Banks To Safeguard Customers, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1984,
at 3, col. 2 (increase in crimes at ATMs as "testimony that any owner must expect
criminal attacks where money, nighttime and lack of security are present") [here-
inafter cited as Duty of Banks]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES, SELECTED ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ISSUES: PRIVACY,
SECURITY AND EQUITY 49-50 (1982) (reporting results of bank survey which con-
servatively estimated that ATM customers had been robbed at 2.5 percent of all
reporting institutions); Zimmer, A TMs 1983: A Critical Assessment, MAG. OF BANK
AD., May 1984, at 32 (citing occurrences of bombings, muggings, robberies, torchings
and shootings at ATMs).
While few civil cases involving thefts at ATMs have been litigated, such robberies
do occur. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 39 Wash. App. 530, 694 P.2d 47 (1985);
Prescott v. State, 642 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Statistics on the number
of ATM robberies that occur are neither kept by police departments nor disclosed
by banks. The Office of Technology Assessment recently published a paper which
discussed the vulnerability of EFT systems to crime, particularly computer fraud,
and explained the scarcity of statistical information. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, SELECTED ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFER ISSUES: PRIVACY, SECURITY AND EQUITY 45 (1982). "EFT crime is poorly
reported because publicity may draw attention to ways of attacking the integrity
of the EFT system, may give organizations a poor public image, or may even raise
insurance premiums." Id. at 45.
7. Due to the scarcity of reported cases concerning ATM robberies, it will be
necessary to refer in this Note to decisions and statutes which have resolved closely
analogous factual and legal situations.
8. See infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
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courts have been reluctant to assess liability against the bank for
the resulting injury or death.' 0 One court did permit a plaintiff to
recover where the harm was economic."
Congress has acted to remedy the various problems with ATMs
by promulgating the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA).' 2 "The
Act [EFTA] establishes the basic rights, liabilities, and responsibilities
of consumers who use electronic money transfer services and of
financial institutions that offer these services." 3 The Federal Reserve
Board subsequently enacted Regulation E,'4 which implements the
EFTA. One provision limits the consumer's liability for "unau-
thorized transfers"' 5 and places the burden of liability on the financial
institutions.' 6 In addition, the Federal Reserve Board has recently
amended Regulation E to include within the definition of an un-
authorized transfer any withdrawal made by a customer pursuant
to a threat of force.' 7
This Note discusses the theories which suggest that banks should
provide protection for patrons of ATMs against criminal acts of
third persons as well as the factors which complicate the imposition
of such a duty.'8 For example, this Note considers how the duty
of care and grounds for liability should vary according to the features
of the particular cash machine being used at the time of the crime. '9
Banks' defenses against liability, including consumers' contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, are also examined. 0 This Note
10. See infra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 90-321 as added Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982)).
13. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1(b) (1985); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (1982) (stating
same proposition).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1985). The primary purpose of Regulation E is to protect
consumers who use EFT systems by imposing certain duties and liabilities on financial
institutions. Id. § 205.1(b).
15. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(1) (1985). " 'Unauthorized electronic fund transfer' means
an electronic fund transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a person other
than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and from which
the consumer receives no benefit." Id.; see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying
text.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1985); see also infra
note 106 and accompanying text. Courts have consistently permitted ATM customers
to recover sums withdrawn from their accounts in an unauthorized manner. See
infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 129-203 and accompanying text for discussions of these
theories.
19. See infra notes 129-88 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
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concludes by recommending flexible guidelines for courts to follow
in determining liability in the event a consumer is robbed at an
ATM terminal. These proposals consider the type of terminal in-
volved,2 geographical limitations within which bank liability can be
imposed,22 the scope of injury,23 conduct of the plaintiff which may
operate to shift all or part of the liability from the bank to the
plaintiff,24 and policy considerations such as consumer protection
and cost.25
II. Landowner Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties
A. General Principles
An owner 26 of premises open to the public for business purposes
may be held accountable for injuries caused by foreseeable, harmful
acts of third persons if he fails to take reasonable measures to warn
or protect against them. 21 Where a warning is insufficient to enable
the public to avoid the harm, a duty to use reasonable care to
21. See infra notes 210-31 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
26. The terms "owner" and "landowner" will be used in this Note to mean
"possessor" where the party in possession has the effective means of control over
the premises. Therefore, while banks are generally lessees, they will be referred to
as owners since they are the parties best able to control bank premises. See infra
note 29 and accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while
they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused
by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons
or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable
care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done,
or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm,
or to otherwise protect them against it.
Id. See generally Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners'
Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIZ. L. REV.
727 (1979) (discussing theories under which landowners can be held liable for
unlawful acts of third parties resulting in injury to patrons upon the land); Wilkins,
Proprietors' Liability to Patrons Injured in Robberies, 47 TENN. L. REV. 743 (1980)
(same); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966) (discussing duty of private person to protect
persons on their premises from criminal attack and liability for failure to provide
such protection).
19861 A TM ROBBERIES
furnish protection is imposed.28 This obligation springs from the
owner's control of the premises, thereby making him the party best
able to detect and respond to the hazard. 29 Under some circumstances
the duty may require the owner to police the premises.30
The degree of care required of a landowner traditionally depended
on whether the party entering his premises was a trespasser, licensee,
or invitee.3' However, this traditional view has been abandoned in
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 comment d (1965).
There are . . . many situations in which the possessor cannot reasonably
assume that a warning will be sufficient. He is then required to exercise
reasonable care to use such means of protection as are available, or to
provide such means in advance because of the likelihood that third persons
. . . may conduct themselves in a manner which will endanger the safety
of the visitor.
Id.; see also id. § 314A (discussing special relations giving rise to a duty to aid
or protect).
29. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 386 (W.
Keeton 5th ed. 1984) ("the person in possession of property ordinarily is in the
best position to discover and control its dangers, and often is responsible for
creating them in the first place") [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 comment f (1965).
If the place or character of his [the possessor's] business, or his past
experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal
conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular
time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to
provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable
protection.
Id.
31. "A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession
of another without a privilege to do so . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 329 (1965); see Bovino v. Metropolitan Dade County, 378 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Murray v. Lane, 51 Md. App. 597, 600, 444 A.2d 1069,
1072 (1982); Monterosso v. Gaudette, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 93, 99-100, 391 N.E.2d
948, 953 (1979); McVicar v. W.R. Arthur & Co., 312 S.W.2d 805, 812 (Mo. 1958);
Rowland v. City of Corpus Christi, 620 S.W.2d 930, 933-34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981);
Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 467 (Wyo. 1981). The traditional rule
provides that the landowner has no duty to make the premises safe for individuals
who are intruding upon his property except that he must refrain from willful,
wanton or reckless conduct. See, e.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 693-94
(Fla. 1973); Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 301, 612 P.2d 142, 144
(1980); Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 245-46, 435 N.E.2d 339, 340 (1982);
McVicar v. W.R. Arthur & Co., 312 S.W.2d at 814; PROSSER, supra note 29, §§
58-59.
A licensee enters the land for his own purposes with consent of the owner.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965); see Hundt v. LaCrosse Grain Co.,
425 N.E.2d 687, 697-98 (Ind. App. 1981), vacated, 446 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1983)
(on grounds that plaintiff was contributorily negligent); Socha v. Passino, 105 Mich.
App. 445, 448, 306 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1981); McCurry v. Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 210 Neb. 278, 280, 313 N.W.2d 689, 691 (1981); Vaughan v. Transit Dev.
Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 82, 118 N.E. 219, 219 (1917); Andrews v. Taylor, 34 N.C.
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIV
a number of jurisdictions in favor of the single standard of "rea-
sonable care under the circumstances."" In determining what con-
stitutes "reasonable care," these courts weigh such factors as plaintiff's
App. 706, 709, 239 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1977). The older common law cases held that
the landowner had no obligation to protect licensees upon his land except to prevent
infliction of willful, wanton or reckless injury. See Rosenberger v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 318 I11. App. 8, 13, 47 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1943); Steinmeyer v. McPherson,
171 Kan. 275, 278, 232 P.2d 236, 239 (1951); Colbert v. Ricker, 314 Mass. 138,
141, 49 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1943); Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. at 82-
83, 118 N.E. at 220; Andrews v. Taylor, 34 N.C. App. at 709, 239 S.E.2d at
632. Today it is generally held that the owner must exercise reasonable care in his
activities and take steps to warn of known, hidden dangers. See Savignac v.
Department of Transp., 406 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Sideman
v. Guttman, 38 A.D.2d 420, 421, 330 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (1972); Fitch v. Adler,
51 Or. App. 845, 848, 627 P.2d 36, 39 (1981); Rowland v. City of Corpus Christi,
620 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); PROSSER, supra note 29, § 60.
Those who enter land with the consent and for the purposes of the landowner
are known as invitees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). Some courts
require that the landowner derive some benefit from the entrant's presence. See
Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 2 Kan. App. 2d 491, 496-97, 582 P.2d 300,
305 (1978) (applying standard of "economic benefit"); Madrazo v. Michaels, 1 111.
App. 3d 583, 587, 274 N.E.2d 635, 638-39 (1971) (applying a "mutuality of benefit"
theory); Socha v. Passino, 105 Mich. App. 445, 447-48, 306 N.W.2d 316, 318
(1981) (requiring any "business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit").
These entrants are "business invitees." Other courts have moved away from the
concept of "benefit" and have held that one who enters land open to the public
for a purpose consistent with the purpose for which the premises exist are "public
invitees." See Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 148-49 (Fla. 1972) (applying
"invitation test"); Augsburger v. Singer, 103 Ill. App. 2d 12, 15, 242 N.E.2d 436,
438 (1968) (same). Owners must use reasonable care to protect invitees from known
hazards as well as hazards of which the owners reasonably should be aware. See
Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 2 Kan. App. 2d at 496, 582 P.2d at 305;
Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117, 113 A.2d 405, 407 (1955);
Revis v. Orr, 234 N.C. 158, 160-61, 66 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1951); PROSSER, supra
note 29, § 61.
Bank customers are business invitees. See, e.g., Nigido v. First Nat'l Bank of
Baltimore, 264 Md. 702, 704, 288 A.2d 127, 128 (1972); Howlett v; Dorchester
Trust Co., 256 Mass. 544, 546, 152 N.E. 895, 896 (1926); Noll v. Marian, 347
Pa. 213, 214, 32 A.2d 18, 19 (1943) (citing Sinn v. Farmers Deposit Sav. Bank,
300 Pa. 85, 89, 150 A. 163, 164 (1930)).
32. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d
564, 568 (1976) (establishing single standard of care owed to trespassers, licensees
and invitees); see-Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 733 (Alaska
1977) (same); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968) (same); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo.
537, 541, 489 P.2d 308, 311 (1971) (same); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu,
51 Hawaii 134, 135, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969) (same); Cates v. Beauregard Elec.
Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 371 (La.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833
(1976); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 557, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976) (same);
Mariorenzi v. Joseph Diponte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 307, 333 A.2d 127, 133 (1975)
(same); see also Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979) (eliminating
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status on the land, the foreseeability of the injury-producing event,
and the difficulty of protecting against the harm."
Under either the traditional or the single standard approach, where
the plaintiff is on the premises for business purposes he is an invitee,
and the threshold issue in deciding whether the defendant has violated
its duty is whether the criminal act was foreseeable.3 4 If there has
been a history of similar types of criminal activity on the premises,
courts generally have held that foreseeability was established. 5 If
the crime at issue was an isolated incident, some courts have held
that such random criminal activity on the part of a third person
was not a foreseeable event,36 while a few have maintained that a
distinction between licensee and invitee only); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d
746, 751 (N.D. 1977) (same); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707-08, 297 N.E.2d
43, 51-52 (1973) (same); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164, 199 N.W.2d 639,
642 (1972) (same); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 856-57, 236 N.W.2d
1, 11-12 (1975) (same). See generally PROSSER, supra note 29, § 62 (discussing the
trend toward abolition of distinctions between trespasser, licensee and invitee when
determining standard of care).
33. See Quinlan v. Cecchini, 41 N.Y.2d 686, 363 N.E.2d 578, 394 N.Y.S.2d
872 (1977).
[The court] may consider whether the foreseeability of the presence of
an entrant on land is too remote, given the nature of the risk and the
burdens that would be imposed on a landowner to guard against it. It
is also concerned with the weighing of the probability of the harm, the
gravity of the harm against the burden of precaution, and other relevant
and material considerations ....
Id. at 689, 363 N.E.2d at 581, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
34. See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 568 (foreseeability used as measure of liability); Foster v. Winston-
Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 640, 281 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1981) ("foreseeability
is the test in determining the extent of a landowner's duty to safeguard his business
invitees from the criminal acts of third persons").
35. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 386 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (owners of sports arena could have anticipated robbery and stabbing
of patron in parking lot where prior attacks had occurred); Stalzer v. European
Am. Bank, 113 Misc. 2d 77, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (bank knew
or had reason to know from past experience that thefts were likely to occur at
particular branch); Urbano v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 58 N.C. App. 795, 295
S.E.2d 240 (1982) (motel owner should have been alerted to danger to guests in
light of twelve previous crimes on premises).
36. See, e.g., Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 507 F.
Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1981) (abduction of woman from parking lot and subsequent
rape found to be an unforeseeable event); Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
342 F. Supp. 862 (D. Minn. 1972) (assault of woman in railroad parking lot could
not have been anticipated); McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App.
755, 272 S.E.2d 592 (1980) (robbery of bank patron in parking lot by two female
assailants was a sudden unforeseeable occurrence); Pennington v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., 393 So. 2d 360 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (owner of fast food restaurant
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likelihood of unlawful conduct was sufficient to establish foresee-
ability.37 The best view, however, determines the foreseeability of
the criminal act not solely in terms of prior similar occurrences,
but in light of the "totality of the circumstances.""
Closely related to foreseeability is the issue of proximate cause.39
When a defendant has been negligent by breaching the duty of
could not have predicted that patron would be knocked to floor when her purse
was snatched); Rosensteil v. Lisdas, 253 Or. 625, 456 P.2d 61 (1969) (restaurant
owner could not anticipate that two fighting men would burst into restaurant).
These cases are based on a common assumption that foreseeability of the criminal
act arises only when there have been prior like crimes on the premises. This view
recently has been discredited in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d
112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985). The court revealed the flawed
reasoning underlying the rule requiring the plaintiff to put forth evidence of prior
similar incidents:
First, the rule .... has the effect of discouraging landowners from
taking adequate measures to protect premises which they know are dan-
gerous . . . .Moreover, under the rule, the first victim always loses,
while subsequent victims are permitted recovery . . . . Second, a rule
which limits evidence of foreseeability to prior similar criminal acts leads
to arbitrary results and distinctions . . . . Third, the rule erroneously
equates foreseeability of a particular act with previous occurrences of
similar acts.
695 P.2d at 658-59, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
37. See, e.g., Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947) (foreseeable
danger may be found where defendant "was aware of conditions which created a
likelihood" of criminal activity); see also Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App.
2d 141, 145, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896-97 (1962) (rape of eleven year old girl at
summer camp was foreseeable in light of dangerous persons in vicinity and inadequate
nighttime supervision); Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 383 I11. 366, 380, 50
N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943) (presence of hoboes and tramps in railroad yard sufficient
to alert owner that assaults could occur). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 344 comment f (1965) (speaking of foreseeability as "a likelihood of
conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the
safety of the visitor, even though . . . [there is] no reason to expect it on the part
of any particular individual").
One court, however, held that there was no landowner liability despite a high
degree of foreseeability. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186
A.2d 291 (1962). Reasoning that criminal conduct can be anticipated "virtually
anywhere and at anytime," the court stated that the issue to be resolved was not
foreseeabilty of criminal activity, but whether an affirmative duty to protect against
it should be attributed to the landowner. Id. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293. See infra
notes 52-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of this decision.
38. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d at 661, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
364 ("other types of evidence may also establish foreseeability, such as the nature,
condition and location of the defendant's premises").
39. Proximate cause, also referred to as to as legal cause, has been defined in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431: "[t]he actor's negligent conduct is a
legal cause of harm to another if ... his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm . . . ." For a thorough examination of legal cause, see Green, The
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reasonable care to another, he will be liable only if the negligent
act was the proximate cause of an injury.40 If the plaintiff's injury
is inflicted by a third party on defendant's premises, the court must
determine whether the defendant's failure to protect the plaintiff
was a proximate cause41 or whether the third party's criminal act
constituted a superseding cause. 42 Defendants have not been held
liable where the criminal acts of third persons were found to break
the chain of events linking defendants' negligence to plaintiffs' harm. 4
3
However, if the defendant had reason to anticipate the crime, 44 the
third party's acts will not be considered an intervening force and
the defendant's failure to take reasonable protective measures will
be considered a proximate cause of the injury.45
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962); Morris,
Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1952); PROSSER, supra
note 29, §§ 41-44.
40. See, e.g., Tyndall v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 266, 269 (E.D.N.C. 1969),
aff'd, 430 F.2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1970); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
430 (setting forth the requirement of an adequate causal relation between the
negligence and the harm); PROSSER, supra note 29, §§ 41-42 (discussing the various
tests for determining proximate cause).
41. The defendant's failure to protect need not be the sole cause or even the
principle cause of plaintiff's injury. It need only be "a" legal cause. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 comment d (1965).
If the effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously
operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's
innocent, tortious, or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm does not protect the actor from liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 439 (1965).
42. "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by
its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which
his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). See id. §§ 442-453 (setting forth rules for
determining when an intervening force constitutes a superseding cause); PROSSER,
supra note 29, § 44 (examining the circumstances under which a negligent defendant
will be relieved of liability due to third person's superseding actions).
43. See, e.g., Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 507 F.
Supp. at 457-58 (abduction of plaintiff from parking facility was a superseding
cause despite inadequate security precautions by defendant); Herold v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 342 F. Supp. at 864 (assault of employee in parking lot was a
"completely independent intervening force").
44. The elements of foreseeability and causation are closely connected. Whether
the defendant's acts constitute a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury hinges
on whether the harm was foreseeable. See, e.g., Tyndall v. United States, 306 F.
Supp. at 269 ("requisite for the finding of proximate cause is the foreseeability
of the injury"); Wallinga v. Johnson, 269 Minn. 436, 440, 131 N.W.2d 216, 219
(1964) ("criminal intervening force . . . cannot be a legally effective superseding
cause unless it possesses the attribute of unforeseeability").
45. See, e.g., Morse v. Homer's, Inc., 295 Mass. 606, 610, 4 N.E.2d 625, 627-
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B. Landlord Liability
General landowner liability principles are clearly illustrated in cases
where tenants or visitors have sued landlords for injuries inflicted
by intruders in common areas of the premises. 46 Where the danger
could have been anticipated and the landlord failed to maintain
adequate security, courts have held that the landlord breached the
duty of reasonable care and was therefore liable to the injured
party. 7
In Kline v. Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,4s the court
28 (1936) (theft of ring from bailee by criminal could have been foreseen and
therefore did not supersede bailee's negligence as the legal cause); Hines v. Garrett,
131 Va. 125, 140-41, 108 S.E. 690, 694-95 (1921) (rape could have been anticipated
when conductor negligently discharged female passenger alongside tracks at night
and therefore criminal acts did not supersede railroad's negligence); McLeod v.
Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 321, 255 P.2d 360, 363(1953) (boys' acts did not supersede school's negligence because forcible rape of
young girl in unsupervised gymnasium "fell within a general field of danger which
should have been anticipated").
46. For a thorough discussion of landlord liability for criminal acts of third
parties, see Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime?, 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 299 (1981); Moore, The Landlord's Liability to His Tenants for
Injuries Criminally Inflicted by Third Persons, 17 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1984);
Smith, The Landlord's Duty to Defend His Tenants Against Crime on the Premises,
4 WHITTIER L. REV. 587 (1982); see also Note, Municipal Tort Liability for Criminal
Attacks Against Passengers on Mass Transportation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 325,
332 n.56 (1984) (citing additional articles).
47. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (tenant mugged in common hallway of building with history of such
incidents); Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D.C.
Kan. 1980) (tenant raped after landlord decreased frequency of security patrols);
Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977) (tenant shot in common hallway of
residence by assailant who entered through unlocked front door); Nallan v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1980) (guest shot
in unattended lobby while signing register); Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp.,
47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dept. 1975) (tenant assaulted and robbed
by intruder who gained access to building as result of broken lock); Skaria v.
State, 110 Misc. 2d 711, 442 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981) (tenant raped when
superintendant failed to lock elevator controls which would have prevented access
to basement at night); Dick v. Great South Bay Co., 106 Misc. 2d 686, 435
N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (tenant robbed and assaulted by intruders who
gained access through unsecured front door), modified and aff'd, 109 Misc. 2d
473, 442 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Term. 1981). But see Goldberg v. Housing
Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962) (landlord did not breach duty
of reasonable care to deliveryman beaten and robbed by assailants in elevator since
duty to provide police protection is not required of private persons); Feld v. Merriam,
506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984) (landlord generally can not be held liable for
criminal acts of third persons because they constitute conduct of unpredictable
independent agents).
48. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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permitted recovery from a landlord for injuries sustained by a tenant
who was attacked and robbed in the hallway of her apartment
building.4 9 The court held that the landlord's duty stemmed from
his control of the common areas of the building which vested him
with exclusive power to guard against foreseeable dangers. 0 The
landlord breached this duty by failing to post security guards or to
take other protective measures despite his knowledge of previous
incidents of crime in the building.'
A different view was taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark." In Goldberg, the plain-
tiff sued the owner of a housing project to recover for injuries
inflicted by two assailants who had beaten and robbed him in an
elevator as he was making a delivery to a tenant." The plaintiff
claimed that the landlord had breached a duty to provide police
protection.14 In a sharply divided decision,55 the court reversed the
jury's finding that the landlord had been negligent in failing to take
protective measures and that he should be held accountable for the
plaintiff's injuries.16 Despite a finding of foreseeability, the majority
declined to impose a duty upon the landlord to provide police
protection for a non-tenant. 7 The court held that this responsibility
properly rested with the government. 8
49. Id. at 478.
50. Explaining its decision, the court stated: "we place the duty of taking
protective measures guarding the entire premises and the areas peculiarly under the
landlord's control against the perpetration of criminal acts upon the landlord, the
party to the lease contract who has the effective capacity to perform these necessary
acts." Id. at 482.
51. Id. at 486-87.
52. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
53. Id. at 579, 186 A.2d at 291.
54. Id. at 580, 186 A.2d at 291.
55. The justices in Goldberg split four to three. Id. at 609, 186 A.2d at 299.
56. 70 N.J. Super. 245, 175 A.2d 433 (App. Div. 1961), rev'd, 38 N.J. 578,
186 A.2d 291 (1962).
57. The majority stated that since crime can be anticipated everywhere at all
times, the question of foreseeability was not the determining factor. The ultimate
issue, the court stated, was whether it was equitable to impose a duty on the
defendant to provide police protection against crime in light of the relationship
between the parties, the type of risk and the interest to society in preventing the
harm. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293.
58. Id. at 588-92, 186 A.2d at 296-99 ("duty to provide police protection is
and should remain the duty of government and not of the owner of a housing
project"). Id. at 592, 186 A.2d at 298-99. But see Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave.
Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Municipal police cannot
patrol the entryways and the hallways, the garages and the basements of private
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The position of the Goldberg majority was countered by a strong
dissent" which stressed that basic precepts of negligence law require
that responsibility for safeguarding persons entering premises and
liability for any harm resulting from failure to meet that responsibility
must rest with the landlord, the party in control.6" This position
accords with the Kline6' court's statement that "[n]ot only as between
landlord and tenant . . . , but even as between the landlord and
the police power of government, the landlord is in the best position
to take the necessary protective measures.' '62
Kline and Goldberg are distinguishable in that the former involved
a tenant's claim against his landlord while the latter involved a
lawsuit by a visitor to the premises. A landlord's duty to his tenant
is founded upon more than mere landowner liability in that the
lease agreement is treated as a contract under which a tenant, who
pays rent to the landlord each month in exchange for residential or
commercial space, is entitled to various services.63 Some courts have
held that where the landlord has undertaken to install locks or take
other protective measures, he has a duty to maintain the level of
security that existed at the beginning of the tenant's lease term.64
A landlord and a visitor to the premises, like the plaintiff deliveryman
in Goldberg, do not share a contractual relationship. Nevertheless,
in suits by non-tenants, courts have held landlords liable for criminal
multiple unit apartment dwellings. They are neither equipped, manned, nor em-
powered to do so.")
59. Id. at 593-609, 186 A.2d at 299-307 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 609, 186 A.2d at 307 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
61. 439 F.2d at 477.
62. Id. at 484.
63. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (lease conveys not only property interest but "a
well known package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing
facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance"
(emphasis added)). However, the warranty of habitability has been held not to
extend to protection from injury caused by third parties. Hall v. Park Dell Terrace
Partnership, 425 So. 2d 372 (La. Ct. App. 1982). See generally Quinn & Phillips,
The Law of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past With Guidelines
for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Comment, Implied Warranty of
Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 123 (1971).
64. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 485 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157, 1160
(D.C. Kan. 1980); Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 139, 365
N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (2d Dep't. 1975).
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acts of third parties on the ground that control of the premises,
not contractual obligation, is the cornerstone of landlord liability.
65
In Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. ,66 the plaintiff, a visitor to a
Manhattan office building who was shot as he signed the guest
register in an unattended lobby, brought a cause of action for
negligence against the landlord. The New York State Court of
Appeals overruled a former ruling which had held that plaintiff's
injuries were neither foreseeable nor a proximate result of the land-
lord's conduct. 67 Given the likelihood of criminal activity in the
building after business hours, the court determined that the absence
of a lobby attendant at the time of the shooting may have been a
proximate cause of the injury. 6 The court concluded that the facts
in the record tended to indicate liability on the part of the landlord. 69
Nallan, therefore, illustrates that the landlord's duty to protect
against criminal attack does not hinge on a contractual relationship
but springs from the elements of foreseeability and control.
C. Bank Liability
Banks have been held to a higher standard of care than have
owners of ordinary commercial establishments.70 Therefore, what
constitutes reasonable care on the part of the average owner of
business premises may not amount to reasonable care on the part
65. See Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979); Chrysler Corp.
v. M. Present Co., 491 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1974); Weber v. Schlemmer, 365
F.2d 323, 325-26 (6th Cir. 1966); Hanko v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1280,
1283 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 749 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1984). But see Weaver v. Albee,
350 F.2d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding that landlord's only duty to tenant's
guest is avoidance of intentional infliction of harm).
66. 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1980).
67. Id. at 521, 407 N.E.2d at 456, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (1980).
68. Id. at 521, 407 N.E.2d at 458-59, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 613-15.
69. Id. at 523, 407 N.E.2d at 460, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
70. See Rothschild v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 279 N.Y. 355, 18 N.E.2d 527
(1939). "A banking corporation occupies a different relation to the public than
do ordinary corporations, and its transactions frequently are subjected to a closer
scrutiny and tested by a higher standard than that applied to ordinary commercial
affairs." Id. at 359, 18 N.E.2d at 528; see also Stalzer v. European Am. Bank,
113 Misc. 2d 77, 81, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (public's perception
of bank as a secure environment in which to conduct financial business "makes
a bank quite different from any other store or commercial premises"). But see
Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 424 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1982)
(court refused to adopt "special duty" of bank to customers); Nigido v. First Nat'l
Bank, 264 Md. 702, 704, 288 A.2d 127, 128 (1972) (duty of bank to protect
customers from robberies no greater than that of ordinary shopkeeper).
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of a bank. Nevertheless, this principle can not be extended to require
banks to become insurers of the public safety.7"
In general, customers have been unable to recover for physical
injuries sustained during bank robberies.72 Courts have denied re-
covery for physical harm on several grounds which, while plausible
in the holdup context, have no application to cases of ATM theft.73
In Nigido v. First National Bank of Baltimore,74 a customer who
was shot in the course of a robbery sued the bank for negligence,
claiming that security devices were not in proper working order,
that the building was not adequately guarded, and that, in light of
prior robberies, these omissions constituted a breach of the bank's
duty to him. 5 The court reasoned: (a) that while bank robberies
may have been foreseeable, shootings were not; (b) that there was
no effective way for the bank to screen potential bank robbers from
customers; and (c) that the presence of armed guards on bank
premises might have prompted bloodshed, not prevented it. 76 Con-
sequently, the plaintiff was unable to recover.77
In Noll v. Marian,8 plaintiff was wounded when armed robbers,
who entered the bank and announced, "It's a holdup. Nobody
should move," began shooting when a teller grabbed something and
ducked behind the counter.7 9 Plaintiff alleged that the bank, through
71. See Drake v. Sun Bank and Trust, 377 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (citing Burgess v. Chicopee Sav. Bank, 336 Mass. 331, 333, 145 N.E.2d
688, 690 (1957)), rev'd, 400 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 comment d (1965) ("possessor of land who
holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is not an insurer
of the safety of such visitors against the acts of third persons . . . ").
72. See, e.g., Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 424 So. 2d 594
(Ala. 1982); Hewett v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 773, 272 S.E.2d 744 (1980);
Bence v. Crawford Say. & Loan Ass'n, 80 Ill. App. 3d 491, 400 N.E.2d 39 (1980);
Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Il1. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d 334 (1952); Nigido
v. First Nat'l Bank, 264 Md. 702, 288 A.2d 127 (1972); Noll v. Marian, 347 Pa.
213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943). But see Drake v. Sun Bank and Trust, 400 So. 2d 569
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing dismissal of complaint on grounds that
plaintiff's amended complaint, containing allegations that bank was in high crime
area, provided little protection, and should have been aware of risk in light of
prior similar incidents, stated a cause of action in negligence); Sinn v. Farmers
Deposit Say. Bank, 300 Pa. 85, 150 A. 163 (1930) (recovery permitted when bank
employees stalled robber carrying bomb which subsequently exploded, injuring
plaintiff),
73. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
74. 264 Md. 702, 288 A.2d 127 (1972).
75. Id. at 703-04, 288 A.2d at 127.
76. Id. at 704-06, 288 A.2d at 128-29.
77. Id. at 711, 288 A.2d at 131.
78. 347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943).
79. Id. at 214, 32 A.2d at 18-19.
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its employee, had been negligent in failing to obey the robbers'
demands. 0 The court determined that the bank did have a duty to
use reasonable care for the protection of its patrons,"' but that the
duty had not been breached since the emergency doctrine applied.
The actions of the robbers were so sudden and unforeseeable that
they presented defendant's employee with an emergency situation in
which negligence could not be implied. 2
The court in Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc.8 a stressed
the policy reasons against imposing liability against banks for injuries
inflicted by bank robbers. 4 In Boyd, the plaintiff's husband was
shot and killed when a bank teller failed to comply with a robber's
demands.8 5 The plaintiff alleged that the failure of the teller to
acquiesce, as well as the bank's failure to instruct tellers how to
respond during bank robberies, constituted a breach of duty to
customers. 6 The court, however, held that no duty to accede to
criminal demands should be imposed. 7 Such an obligation actually
would provide an incentive for bank robbers to threaten or commit
violence so as to compel banks either to turn over their funds or
to risk liability for harm to their patrons. 8
However, in Stalzer v. European American Bank, 9 where a cus-
tomer was robbed on bank premises immediately after cashing a
check, the bank was held accountable for the economic loss. 9° The
Stalzer court held that bank patrons have a right to expect a secure
80. Id., 32 A.2d at 19.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 215-16, 32 A.2d at 19-20.
83. 56 111. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1973).
84. Id. at 99-100, 306 N.E.2d at 41-42.
85. Id. at 96, 306 N.E.2d at 40.
86. Id. at 96-97, 306 N.E.2d at 40.
87. Id. at 100, 306 N.E.2d at 42.
88.
If a duty to comply exists, the occupier of premises would have little
choice in determining whether to comply with the criminal demands and
surrender the money or to refuse the demand and be held liable in a
civil action for damages brought by or on behalf of the hostage. The
existence of this dilemma and knowledge of it by those who are disposed
to commit such crimes will only grant to them additional leverage to
enforce their criminal demands. The only persons who will clearly benefit
from the imposition of such a duty are the criminals.
Id.
89. 113 Misc. 2d 77, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
90. The plaintiff in Stalzer sued solely for loss of money. The Stalzer opinion
explicitly distinguishes itself from prior decisions where plaintiffs were physically
injured during the course of bank robberies. Id. at 81, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
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environment in which to conduct their financial transactions. 9 The
nature of a bank as a holder and distributor of money, "a most
convertible commodity," 92 poses a foreseeable risk of theft to the
public. 93 Particularly where there have been prior incidents of har-
assment or theft, the bank must take steps to adequately protect
its patrons. 94
III. Bank Liability for "Unauthorized Transfers" at ATMs
A. The Electronic Fund Transfers Act
In 1974, Congress established the National Commission on Elec-
tronic Fund Transfers (Commission) to study electronic fund transfer
systems and to make recommendations concerning this new form
of financial technology. 95 Based on proposals in the Commission's
final report, which was issued on October 28, 1977,96 Congress
enacted the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA) on November
10, 1978.97
While the EFTA does not include provisions establishing rights
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 83, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
94. The Stalzer court held:
[Wihere, as here, the bank either knows or has reason to know from
past experience that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third
persons which is likely to endanger the safety of a bank visitor, the
bank is obliged to take all necessary protective measures and to provide
a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford reasonable protection.
Id.
95. Title II of the Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1508 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2408 (1982)). Congress directed that "[tihe
Commission shall conduct a thorough study and investigation and recommend
appropriate administrative action and legislation necessary in connection with the
possible development of public or private electronic fund transfer systems ......
12 U.S.C. § 2403(a).
96. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 states:
(a) The Congress finds that the use of electronic systems to transfer
funds provides the potential for substantial benefits to consumers. How-
ever, due to the unique characteristics of such systems, the application
of existing consumer protection legislation is unclear, leaving the rights
and liabilities of consumers, financial institutions, and intermediaries in
electronic fund tranfers undefined.
(b) It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide a basic framework
establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in
electronic fund transfer systems . . ..
Pub. L. No. 90-321 § 902, as added Title XX of the Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub.
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and liabilities in the event of a robbery or assault at an ATM, it
clarifies these issues with respect to the analagous situation of an
unauthorized transfer. 9s Typically, unauthorized transfers take the
form of much publicized "scams' 99 in which ATM customers are
duped into allowing strangers to use their access cards. By doing
so, customers unwittingly permit thieves to withdraw funds from
their accounts."°°
To protect consumers, Congress established limits on liability in
the event that funds are withdrawn from customers' accounts in an
unauthorized manner.'0 ' Under the EFTA, if the bank fails to meet
certain threshold issuance and disclosure requirements, the consumer
incurs no liability whatsoever.0 2 If the bank has complied with these
requirements, consumer liability is limited to the lesser of fifty dollars
or the amount of money actually withdrawn in an unauthorized
manner, provided that the consumer notifies the bank within two
business days after learning of the theft.0 3 If the loss is not reported
L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1693
(1982)); see also S. REP. No. 915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9403.
98. See supra note 15.
99. The "scam" has been described as follows:
A customer enters the automated teller machine (ATM) area for the
purpose of using a machine for the transaction of business with the
bank. At the time that he enters, a person is using the customer service
telephone located between the two automated teller machines and appears
to be telling customer service that one of the machines is malfunctioning.
This person is the perpetrator of the scam and his conversation with
customer service is only simulated. He observes the customer press his
personal identification code into one of the two machines. Having learned
the code, the perpetrator then tells the customer that customer service
had advised him to ask the customer to insert his [ATM card] into the
allegedly malfunctioning machine to check whether it will work with a
card other than the perpetrator's. When a good samaritan customer
accedes to the request, the other machine is activated. The perpetrator
then presses a code into the machine, which the customer does not realize
is his own code ... [permitting] a cash withdrawal from the unwary
customer's account.
Ognibene v. Citibank, N.A., 112 Misc. 2d 219, 219-20, 446 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1982, at B2, col. 5.
100. Id.
101. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1985).
102. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a) (1985). Regulation E provides that a consumer will
incur liability only if the bank has provided the consumer with means of identification
(such as a personal identification code) and with written information disclosing
potential consumer liability, the procedure to be followed in the event that an
access card is lost or stolen, and the bank's business hours. Id.
103. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1) (1985).
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within this time, the cap on consumer liability rises to a maximum
of five hundred dollars.' °4 Only if the consumer fails to notify the
bank within sixty days of an unauthorized transfer appearing on
his bank statement will he be subject to unlimited liability, totalling
the amount of such unauthorized transfer plus the amount of any
subsequent unauthorized transfers which the bank can establish would
not have occurred but for the consumer's failure to notify., 05 Clearly,
the burden of liability for losses due to unauthorized transfers lies
with the financial institutions. 0 6
B. Case Law
Since the EFTA was enacted, several lawsuits have been brought
by consumers against their banks to recover for losses stemming
from unauthorized ATM withdrawals made by perpetrators of a
criminal scheme. 0 7 These incidents were so widespread that one
lawsuit was filed by the Attorney General of New York on behalf
of two classes of Citibank customers who alleged that they either
had been victims of a criminal scheme or had been debited for
withdrawals which they had never personally initiated. 08 The bank
initially refused to refund amounts withdrawn from the plaintiffs'
accounts. 09 Subsequently, however, Citibank agreed to a settlement
in which it would reimburse 485 victims for losses totalling $135,000.""1
104. Id.
105. Id. § 205.6(b)(2).
106. The Commission made the following statement regarding the focus of liability
in its Final Report:
Under these recommendations, the depository institution will be liable
for all thefts of its customer's funds unless it can prove that the customer
ignored the specific warnings . . . and thereby substantially contributed
to the loss . . . . [Pilacing all liability on depository institutions in most
cases will create a strong incentive for institutions to develop and use
the most secure technology possible for customer identification.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
107. See, e.g., In re New York v. Citibank, N.A., 537 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Ognibene v. Citibank, N.A., 112 Misc. 2d 219, 446 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1981); Feldman v. Citibank, 110 Misc. 2d 838, 443 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1981); Judd v. Citibank, 107 Misc. 2d 526, 435 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1980). At this time, the only cases litigated over customers' losses of funds
due to scams have been tried in New York against Citibank.
108. In re New York v. Citibank, N.A., 537 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
109. Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1982, at 20, col. 2.
110. Id. Citibank denied any wrongdoing, basing its decision to return the funds
on the preservation of good customer relations.
[Vol. XIV
1986] A TM ROBBERIES
In Ognibene v. Citibank,"' an ATM user had $400 withdrawn
from his account by the perpetrator of a scam. ' 2 The bank argued
against liability claiming that the consumer, by handing his cash
card to a thief, had thereby furnished him with the means of access
to his account."' Consequently, the bank maintained that the trans-
action was not unauthorized" 4 and the liability provision did not
apply." '5 The court disagreed, concluding that since the consumer
had not supplied the perpetrator with his personal identification code
as well as his card, he had not furnished him with the means of
access." 6 In short, the transaction was unauthorized and the bank
was subject to the liability provision of the EFTA.' 7
C. Recent Amendment of Regulation El 8
The Official Staff Commentary to Regulation E119 illustrates ap-
plications of the regulatory provisions to various fact situations.2 0
Before the recent amendment, the commentary contained two ex-
amples of unauthorized transfers: (1) where there has been a fraud-
111. 112 Misc. 2d 219, 446 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
112. See supra note 99.
113. Ognibene, 112 Misc. 2d at 222, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a excepts from the definition of unauthorized transfers
any transaction "initiated by a person other than the consumer who was furnished
with the card, code, or other means of access to such consumer's account by such
consumer, unless the consumer has notified the financial institution involved that
transfers by such other person are no longer authorized ... ." 15 U.S.C. §
1693a(11)(A) (1982).
115. Ognibene, 112 Misc. 2d at 222, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
116. Id. at 222-23, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48.
117. Id. at 223-24, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 848. The court reasoned:
Since the bank established the electronic fund transfer service and has
the ability to tighten its security characteristics, the responsibility for the
fact that plaintiff's code, one of the two necessary components of the
"access device" or "means of access" to his account, was observed and
utilized ... must rest with the bank.
Id. at 223, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 848; see also Feldman v. Citibank, 110 Misc. 2d 838,
443 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (first plaintiff permitted to recover fully
for sums withdrawn from his account in unauthorized manner, but second plaintiff
limited to amount of first unauthorized transfer only since she failed to notify the
bank within a reasonable time that such a withdrawal had been made from her
account); Judd v. Citibank, 107 Misc. 2d 526, 435 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1980) (plaintiff awarded $800 judgment in lawsuit against bank for unauthorized
withdrawals from her account).
118. 50 Fed. Reg. 13,181 (1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 205, Supp. II, section
205.2, Q2-28).
119. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
120. See 12 C.F.R. § 205, Supp. 11 (1985).
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ulent taking by a financial institution's employee; 2 ' and (2) where
the withdrawal has been accomplished by use of an access device
stolen or fraudulently obtained from the consumer. 22
The Federal Reserve Board periodically updates Regulation E and
the Commentary in order to respond to new developments arising
in the field of electronic fund transfers.2 3 Recently, such an amend-
ment was passed 24 which classifies an ATM withdrawal induced by
force as an unauthorized transfer. 25 As a result, the favorable liability
limitations applicable in cases of unauthorized transfers 26 are avail-
able to victims of forced initiation.
Forced initiation by a third party is closely analagous to an ATM
robbery. The only difference is that, in the former situation, the
thief uses force during the ATM transaction to compel a withdrawal,
while in the latter, the thief uses force or threat of force once the
withdrawal has been completed. The results, however, are identical.
In the case of forced initiation, while the consumer actually performs
the transaction himself, he is acting, in effect, as an instrument for
another. Hence, there is a logical extension of the concept of un-
authorized transfer. A theft perpetrated after the completion of an
121. Id. at section 205.2, Q2-26.
122. Id. at Q2-27.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1693p provides:
Not later than twelve months after the effective date of this subchapter
and at one-year intervals thereafter, the [Federal Reserve] Board shall
make reports to the Congress concerning the administration of its func-
tions under this subchapter, including such recommendations as the Board
deems necessary and appropriate .... In such report[s], the Board shall
particularly address the effects of this subchapter on the costs and benefits
to financial institutions and consumers, on competition, on the intro-
duction of new technology, on the operations of financial institutions,
and on the adequacy of consumer protection.
15 U.S.C. § 1693p (1982).
124. See supra note 118.
125. The text of the amendment reads as follows:
Q2-28: Unauthorized transfers-forced initiation. A consumer is forced
by a robber (at gunpoint, for example) to withdraw cash at an ATM.
Do the liability limits for unauthorized transfers apply?
A: Yes. The transfer is unauthorized for purposes of Regulation E. Under
these circumstances, the actions of the robber are tantamount to use of
a stolen access device.
12 C.F.R. § 205, Supp. II, section 205.2, Q2-28 (1985). Prior to this amendment,
two banks, Texas Federal Savings and The Union Bank and Trust Co., had
voluntarily instituted a policy of reimbursing customers compelled at gunpoint to
make ATM withdrawals. See N.Y. Times, May 25, 1984, at 14, col. 5.
126. See supra notes 101-05 for a description of liability limitations which apply
in the event of an unauthorized transfer.
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ATM transaction cannot be classified as an unauthorized transaction
because the withdrawal was carried out from start to finish by the
consumer on his own behalf."2 7 Nevertheless, the extension of the
sphere of unauthorized transfers to cases of forced initiation is
significant in that it evinces a tendency on the part of the Congress
to enlarge the scope of bank liability in favor of consumer pro-
tection. 128
IV. The Types of ATMs and Corresponding
Theories of Liability
ATMs operate in a variety of settings. Some terminals are situated
on-site, that is, directly within the bank's premises.2 9 Others are
situated off-site, on an outside wall of the bank or at shopping
centers, airports, or other locations where there is a demand for
immediate access to money.'30 Furthermore, off-site machines may
be owned by the bank or owned by the possessor of the site.13'
Finally, on-site or off-site terminals may be shared by several banks
under a network arrangement.3 2 The factors of location and own-
ership bear significantly on the issues of duty and liability.
127. This sequence of events does not satisfy the criteria for an unauthorized
transfer set forth in Regulation E. See supra note 15.
128. The tendency to broaden the scope of bank liability in favor of consumer
rights has been demonstrated in at least two other areas. First, Congress has limited
consumers' liability for losses resulting from unauthorized transfers. See supra notes
101-06 and accompanying text. Additionally, in the consumer credit area, consumer
liability for unauthorized charges initiated with a lost or stolen credit card cannot
exceed $50 and the bank must absorb the remaining loss. See Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1982).
129. See Horan, Outlook for EFT Technology, in COMPUTERS AND BANKING:
ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY 26-27 (K. Colton and
K. Kraemer eds. 1980) (describing the various placements of ATM terminals).
130. Id.
131. For instance, some ATMs have been purchased and installed by supermarkets.
See Independent Bankers Ass'n of N.Y., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F.
Supp. 1042, 1044 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), appeal pending,
106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
132. A network system is formed when two or more banks link their ATM
terminals to a central computer. This permits a customer of an individual member
bank to carry out transactions at any participating bank's terminal, providing
widespread access to his account. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1985, at D1, col. 1.
To use the system, a customer of any member bank who has a bank
machine card, or a Mastercard or Visa credit card issued by one of the
network's members, goes to any teller machine in the system and inserts
the card and enters a personal identification number, the same as at the
customer's own bank's machines. The customer can withdraw cash, make
a balance inquiry or get a cash advance with the credit card. The
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
A. On-site ATMs Situated in an Enclosed Vestibule
The most familiar type of ATM is located at the bank branch
within an enclosed vestibule.'33 After banking hours, the customer
must use his access card to gain entry and the door subsequently
locks behind him. This arrangement, designed to keep out everyone
but ATM cardholders, is not foolproof, and once an intruder is
inside, the secluded vestibule actually provides an attractive envi-
ronment for the perpetration of a crime.' 34
The on-site vestibule presents the strongest case for bank liability.
In general, landowners are liable for injuries caused by reasonably
foreseeable acts of third persons to patrons on their premises.' 35 An
exception has been made by the courts with respect to banks where
customers sustained injuries at the hands of bank robbers.'3 6 How-
ever, since the rationales advanced in cases of bank robbery do not
apply to thefts at ATMs,'37 principles of general landowner liability
should control. In short, since the ATM is situated on bank premises
and the bank exercises exclusive control over the site, it is subject
to liability to its customers for injuries caused by intentionally
harmful acts of third parties if it fails to exercise reasonable care
to furnish protection.' 38
In Oppenheimer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,' 39 the plaintiff
sued his bank after he was assaulted and robbed at a vestibule facility
customer's card even opens the door to the secured area where many
teller machines are located.
The banks' computers have been programmed to identify transactions
by customers of other banks, and to route the necessary information-
the customer's name, account number and, for example, the amount of
cash requested-to a central computer, which routes it to the customer's
bank for verification.
Id. at D13, col. 1.
133. But see infra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of the shift
from on-site ATMs to other types of terminals.
134. See Duty of Banks, supra note 6, at 3, col. 1.
135. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of general
landowner liability principles and notes 70-94 and accompanying text for a discussion
of their application to banks in particular.
The scope of liability will be confined to the area in which the consumer is
present to conduct banking business. See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 61, at 424
("area of invitation"). Therefore, once the customer leaves this area, the bank no
longer can be held responsible for theft of the customer's funds. The question of
scope is not so easily defined where the terminal is situated outside the bank's
premises. See infra notes 163-70.
139. N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1984, at 13, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., May 3, 1984).
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after completing an ATM withdrawal.' 0 The court denied a motion
for summary judgment by the bank, finding that there were material
issues of fact as to the nature and adequacy of security.' 4 Relying
on the principles set forth in Stalzer,'"2 the court focused on the ex-
pectation of bank security by customers" 3 and the foreseeability of
crime at financial institutions.' The Oppenheimer court, however,
emphasized more clearly than the Stalzer court that the risks inherent
in banking transactions are sufficient to support a finding of
foreseeability when it stated: "The robbery of a person using the ser-
vices of a bank, including an automatic money machine in a bank,
is clearly foreseeable even if there were no prior robberies or robberies
of a particular type at that branch."' 4 5
The unique characteristics of ATMs render them especially amen-
able to incidents of this kind.' 46 If thefts occur at crowded banks
during daytime hours, the potential for criminal activity seems greater
at unattended facilities at night. 47 Where danger is more clearly
anticipated, the duty to guard against it should be more stringently
enforced. 148
Moreover, Oppenheimer did not limit recovery solely to financial
loss. 149 Where customers have sued banks for injuries incurred during
bank robberies, recovery for physical harm has been denied con-
sistently.11° However, where a plaintiff sued for financial loss, re-
covery was permitted.' 5' The Oppenheimer opinion, however, draws
140. Id.
141. Id. The case was never tried on the merits. However, the court did discuss
the substantive issues of duty and liability in its opinion denying the bank's summary
judgment motion. Id.
142. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
143. "The issuance of the card and the operation of the bank's premises constitute
an invitation to the public to enter into the bank and expect certain protection."
Oppenheimer, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added); accord Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.
3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985) (evidence of prior similar criminal
activity not necessary to establish foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff).
146. See supra note 6.
147. See Duty of Banks, supra note 6, at 3, col. 1.
148. See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 34, at 208. "The amount of care demanded
by the standard of reasonable conduct must be in proportion to the apparent risk.
As the danger becomes greater, the actor is required to exercise caution commensurate
with it." Id.
149. See Oppenheimer, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
150. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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no distinction between physical and economic harm, but rather speaks
generally of the "extent" of plaintiff's injuries.' 52
When an ATM user is simultaneously robbed and assaulted, he
should be permitted to recover for all injuries, both financial and
physical. The rationales advanced in cases denying recovery for
physical injury incurred during armed robberies'53 do not apply in
the context of an ATM robbery. With respect to foreseeability of
the violent act, 54 assaults can be expected to accompany thefts at
ATMs which are unattended, operate at night, and where the risk
of identification and apprehension of the perpetrator are slight.
Furthermore, the emergency doctrine'55 is not relevant since no bank
teller or other bank employee is present in the ATM setting. Finally,
the deterrence policy advanced in Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange5 6
is likewise inapplicable. The ATM customer carries out his transaction
with an electronic device and, therefore, no bank employee is pre-
sented with a choice between compliance or possible harm to the
customer."' Imposition of liability on the bank for physical injury
to victims of ATM robberies will not provide an incentive to the
perpetrators because it will not provide them with leverage in achiev-
ing their criminal ends.' 58
B. Off-site ATMs
Banks increasingly are installing off-site terminals in order to make
ATM services more easily accessible to their customers.'5 9 When the
ATM is not situated on bank premises, principles of landowner
152. Oppenheimer, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
153. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
policies.
154. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. A recent article described this shift as follows:
In Florida, for example, the rush by financial institutions, retailers and
independent third parties to place off-premises ATMs ... has resulted
in oversaturation. In some urban areas one literally may find an ATM
on each corner of an intersection. Depending on where they bank,
cardholders may participate in shared networks such as Max, Publix
Teller, ADP Exchange, Honor, Plus, Cirrus, etc. Depending on their
financial institution's affiliations, cardholders have access to some portion
of the latticework of shared networks through off-premises bank machines
deployed in Winn Dixie, Kash 'n Karry, Family Mart, and 7-Eleven
stores; and through third-party ATMs in Publix supermarkets and in a
variety of other locations, including free-standing kiosks deployed by the
[Vol. XIV
A TM ROBBERIES
liability' 6° may not apply. Since off-site terminals are installed in a
variety of settings,' 6' theories of liability should be tailored to the
specific features of the terminal involved.
62
1. A TMs Situated in Exterior Walls of Bank Premises
Terminals installed in exterior walls of bank branches can be
viewed as hybrids between on-site and off-site machines. While the
machine itself is part of the physical premises, the user executes his
transaction from the public sidewalk. Consequently, it would appear
that there is no landowner liability for third party criminal assaults.
63
The court in Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd. ,I64 however, took an
extended view of the term premises when it held the bakery liable
for injury to a customer on a public street. In Schwartz, the driver
of a bakery truck told a child that he would wait while the child
went home to get money to make a purchase.' 65 When returning,
the child darted into the street and was struck by a car. 66 The court
found that the child was a business invitee to whom the bakery
owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for his safety "upon all
premises of the business over which [it] exercises control .... 1167
In order to arrive at this conclusion, the court redefined the concept
of premises in the following manner:
[T]he physical area encompassed by the term "the premises" does
not ... coincide with the area to which the invitor possesses a
title or a lease. The "premises" may be less or greater than the
invitor's property. The premises may include such means of ingress
neighborhood banking centers.
DeCotiis and Ora, Fulfilling the Promise of Direct Debit Point of Sale, 167 THE
BANKERS MAGAZINE, May-June 1984, at 50.
160. See supra notes 26-94 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 159.
162. Some ATMs are situated in enclosed areas equipped with security devices.
See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text. Others are installed in open areas
easily accessible to criminals. See infra notes 163-88 and accompanying text. The
degree of care to be exercised by the bank should be proportionate to the risks
posed by the terminal at issue. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text and
note 148 for discussions of reasonable care under the circumstances.
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) ("A possessor of land
who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to
liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose
... .") (emphasis added).
164. 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967).
165. Id. at 235, 430 P.2d at 70, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
166. Id. at 236, 430 P.2d at 70, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
167. Id. at 238, 430 P.2d at 72, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
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and egress as a customer may reasonably be expected to use. The
crucial element is control.' 68
The Schwartz court stretched the concept of extended premises to
include a public highway far from the bakery's premises. It is
questionable whether a bakery truck driver can control all parts of
the public street where he stops to conduct business. However, the
concept of extended premises is decidedly applicable in cases involving
crimes at ATMs situated in exterior walls of banks. The area at
issue directly adjoins bank premises where it would not be unrea-
sonable to expect the bank to exercise some measure of control. 69
Furthermore, it is well established that a landowner who puts the
adjacent sidewalk to a "special use" for his own benefit has a duty
to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. 70
Liability for acts of third persons, however, need not be premised
168. Id. at 239, 430 P.2d at 73, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, an argument can be made that since customers must stand outside to
conduct banking business at this type of ATM terminal, a certain proximate area
constructively becomes part of the premises.
169. However, the difficulty of defining the precise extent of such "premises"
in the ATM context would raise new and troublesome legal questions. For instance,
would the bank be liable for thefts occurring only when the customer is in physical
contact with the terminal, or as he is in the act of transferring the money from
the terminal to his wallet, or as he steps away and slips his wallet into his pocket?
The boundary will be difficult to establish.
170. See, e.g., Merriam v. Anacostia Nat'l Bank, 247 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(pedestrian injured when she fell on sidewalk damaged by defendant's construction
of new building); Barker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 107 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.
1939) (plaintiff stumbled where portion of sidewalk removed for construction of
driveway by defendant); District of Columbia v. Texaco, Inc., 324 A.2d 690 (D.C.
App. 1974) (pedestrian hurt by fall on sidewalk cracked by wear and tear of
defendant's use as driveway). In Texaco, the court held:
[Tihe abutter derives private commercial benefit from the "special use"
and is in the best position to be aware of and to guard against any
dangerous condition caused by this use. Thus, although the District as
the municipality is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining
its sidewalks, this duty becomes secondary to the abutter's when he makes
such "special use" of the sidewalk.
324 A.2d at 692.
For cases holding landowners liable for special uses outside the business premises
that create a risk to others of criminal attack, see Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.,
89 N.J. 270, 275, 445 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1982) (store parking lot within the "scope
of the invitation"); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 638,
281 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1981) (shopping mall parking lot considered part of the premises
to which the landowner's duty to protect extended). But see McClendon v. Citizens
& Southern Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 756, 272 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1980) (bank
not liable when patron held up in parking lot).
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on the defendant's status as landowner. 7 Any party is negligent if
he creates a situation which poses an unreasonable risk of intentional
harm to another by a third party.12 A service which dispenses money
to customers on the street is particularly apt to attract criminal
activity since it is highly visible, unattended and unprotected. Where
a defendant creates a "stimulus"' 73 or an incentive to commit crimes,
an obligation to take security measures arises. 74
2. Teller Machines Installed at Remote Locations
Terminals located at shopping malls, airports, and other such
locations are situated in unprotected, highly-trafficked areas. These
machines, like exterior wall terminals, expose customers to a high
risk of robbery.'75
Off-site teller machines present the most difficult scenario for
imposing a duty on the bank to protect its patrons from criminal
attack. The element of control over the premises is eliminated, 7 6
yet the risk of theft at such a facility is considerable. 7 7 There are
two types of off-site ATMs. The bank may own the terminal itself
and deploy it on commercial premises, 7 1 or the terminal may belong
to the premises owner himself for which the bank agrees to pay a
stipulated fee for access by its customers. 7 9 The issue raised is
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302B, 303 (1965).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965) ("An act or an omission
may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to another through the conduct of ... a third person which is
intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal."); see also id. §
303 ("act is negligent if the actor ... realizes or should realize that it is likely
to affect the conduct of ... a third person ... in such a manner as to create
an unreasonable risk of harm to the other").
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 comment d (1965).
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B comment e (1965). "[Tlhe
actor, as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and guard against the intentional,
or even criminal, misconduct of others . . .where the actor's own affirmative act
has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm
through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account." Id.
175. See supra notes 6, 172-74 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the element
of control.
177. See supra notes 6, 172-74 and accompanying text. The degree of risk, of
course, will vary with respect to each individual facility according to the nature
of the site, its location in the community, and the existence of prior incidents of
crime.
178. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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whether the bank or the owner of the site where the ATM is installed
should have the duty to protect users from criminal attack and bear
liability for loss should such an attack occur.
Clearly the owner of the premises has a duty to take reasonable
measures to insure the safety of invitees upon his premises.18 0 Never-
theless, by arranging for access for its customers, the bank has
participated in exposing them to some risk of criminal attack.181
Where the bank has created a foreseeable risk of harm to its patrons,
it should bear some responsibility in protecting against the risk, as
well as some measure of liability, should the customer be harmed.' 82
Furthermore, if banks were held liable for thefts at on-site ATMs
but not for those at terminals located off the premises, courts would
be creating an incentive for banks to install their terminals at the
off-site, more dangerous locations. Since it is unfeasible for banks
to supervise activities on others' premises, it is suggested that banks
provide in their contracts with the site owners that the owners take
appropriate security measures.8 3 In this way, if a bank is found
liable for failing to provide reasonable protection for its patrons at
an ATM, it can recover from the site owner for breach of its
contractual duty.
C. ATMs Shared Under a Network Arrangement
Banks increasingly are entering into agreements with other banks
whereby they link their ATM terminals to a central computer, thereby
enabling customers of any member bank to initiate transactions at
any other participant's terminal. 8 4 If a customer is robbed while
180. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty
of a landowner to exercise reasonable care to protect persons on the premises.
181. See supra notes 6, 172-74 and accompanying text.
182. Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, where two or more parties
have acted in concert to commit a tort, they are deemed joint tortfeasors and each
is liable to the plaintiff in damages. See, e.g., McLeod v. American Motors Corp.,
723 F.2d 830, reh'g denied, 729 F.2d 1468 (lth Cir. 1984); Foshee v. Lloyds,
New York, 643 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1981); Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d
714 (2d Cir. 1978); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
183. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Marine Midland
Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir.), appeal pending, 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985) (supermarket
which owned terminal was obligated under agreement with bank to provide security
and take out insurance).
184. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. By August 1984, approximately
45%o of all ATMs in the United States were affiliated with one of about 175
regional networks. Zimmer, A TMs 1984: A Time for Opportunity, MAG. OF BANK
AD., May 1985, at 26; see also Ingram & Boomstein, Shared ATM Networks:
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withdrawing funds from his bank account at another network par-
ticipant's terminal, the question of which bank should be accountable
arises. Liability for loss due to theft or assault at a network facility
situated on a member bank's premises could be attributed both to
that member in which the plaintiff is a depositor'85 and to the bank
on whose premises the crime occurred. 86 If the network terminal is
located on commercial premises, 8 7 the member banks should contract
with the landowner to insure that some means of protection for
their patrons is provided. 88
V. The Bank's Defenses: Contributory or Comparative
Negligence and Assumption of Risk
When a plaintiff encounters a risk created by the defendant's
negligence and fails to respond in a reasonable manner so as to
avoid the harm, the plaintiff will be said to have contributed to his
own injury.'89 Traditionally, if the plaintiff had been found guilty
of contributory negligence, he would have been barred from re-
covery. 90 Since this yielded a harsh result, most states replaced
contributory negligence with comparative negligence,'1' which gen-
Legal and Operational Aspects, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 58-
59.
185. Such liability could be based on a combination of factors. For instance, a
depositor has a right to expect that his bank will provide him with a secure
environment in which to conduct his banking business. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text. In addition, the bank should be aware of the foreseeability of
such incidents occurring at ATM facilities. See supra note 6.
186. See supra notes 26-45 for a discussion of general landowner liability prin-
ciples.
187. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Marine Midland
Bank, 757 F.2d at 455-56.
188. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). See generally James, Con-
tributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953) (explaining the development and
basic elements of the contributory negligence defense); PROSSER, supra note 29, §
65 (same).
190. See Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429, 281 N.W. 261,
263 (1938) (discussing hardships to plaintiff under traditional contributory negligence
rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965).
191. Forty-one states had shifted from a contributory to a comparative negligence
theory by July 1985. Nine states adopted comparative negligence judicially. See
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d
431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Goetzman
v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405
Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
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erally apportions damages between the plaintiff and the defendant
according to their respective degrees of fault.
92
Banks are likely to argue that if dangers posed by ATMs are so
foreseeable, consumers must recognize them as well. Consequently,
banks would maintain that when a consumer carries out an ATM
transaction, particularly at night or in a high-crime neighborhood,
his conduct itself is negligent and fails to conform to the standard
which a reasonable person would observe for his own safety. How-
ever, "[i]f the defendant's negligence has made the plaintiff's exercise
of a right or privilege impossible unless he exposes himself to a risk
of bodily harm, the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence
in so doing unless he acts unreasonably."' 93 Whether the customer
has acted in an unreasonable manner depends on the circumstances
of each individual case.
In addition, banks may raise the defense of assumption of risk.
In order to assume the risk, a person' must know of the danger
1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). But see Golden v. McCurry, 392 So.
2d 815 (Ala. 1980) (Alabama Supreme Court declined judicial adoption of com-
parative negligence, holding that such a change was responsibility of legislature);
Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983)
(Maryland Court of Appeals refused to adopt comparative negligence judicially).
Thirty-two states have enacted comparative negligence statutes. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 12-2505 (West Supp. 1985-86); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765
(1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-572h (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801, 6-806 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-
33-1 to -13 (Burns Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1983); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-702 (1985); NEaB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.141 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-
5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413 (McKinney
1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West Supp. 1985-86); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.470 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102a (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-20-4 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-41 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983);
Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
The states retaining contributory negligence are Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
For a description of the development of the comparative negligence doctrine in
the United States, see generally WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT
(1978 & Cum. Supp. July 1984); PROSSER, supra note 29, § 67.
192. See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 67.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 473 (1965).
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and appreciate its gravity' 94 yet voluntarily decide to proceed with
the course of action and take his chances. 95 Assumption of risk
may be expressly stated196 or implied from the plaintiff's conduct. 97
The essence of assumption of risk is that the plaintiff chooses
voluntarily, by words or actions, to encounter the known danger,
thereby releasing the defendant from responsibility. 9 Implied as-
sumption of risk, which is usually a complete bar to recovery, 99
has been abolished or merged with contributory negligence in a
number of jurisdictions.2°°
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965); see Cincinnati, New Orleans
& Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 236 F. 1, 9 (6th Cir. 1916) ("[klnowledge
of the risk is the watchword of the defense of assumption of risk"); Garcia v.
City of South Tucson, 131 Ariz. 315, 319, 640 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Ariz. 604, 663 P.2d 596 (1983) ("plaintiff must
have actual knowledge of the specific risk which injured him and appreciate its
magnitude").
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965); see Garcia, 131 Ariz. at
319, 640 P.2d at 1121 ("[ajssumption of risk ... is fundamentally based on
consent"); Parker v. Roszell, 617 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("[The
defense] does not mean a hunter assumes the risk of being shot merely because
he participates in that activity. Assumption of risk is based upon a voluntary
consent .... "); see also PROSSER, supra note 29, § 68, at 489 (implied assumption
of risk focuses more on plaintiff's consent than his knowledge).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
197. Id. § 496C.
198. See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 68, at 490-92. There may be circumstances
in which the victim of an ATM robbery knew of the danger, comprehended its
magnitude, and chose to proceed in spite of it. For instance, a customer who freely
elects to enter an ATM vestibule and make a withdrawal, despite his awareness
that a suspicious person, who is clearly not conducting banking business, is lurking
inside, could be said to have assumed the risk.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965) ("A plaintiff who voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant cannot recover for such harm.").
200. Five states have abolished or merged implied assumption of risk statutorily.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(c) (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/
Law. Coop. 1985); N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.475(2) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977).
Many state courts have held that implied assumption of risk no longer operates
as a complete bar to recovery. See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61 (Alaska 1968);
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975);
Frelick v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 51 Del. 568, 150 A.2d 17 (1959); Blackburn
v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 49 Hawaii
351, 417 P.2d 816 (1966); Smith v. Blakey, 213 Kan. 91, 515 P.2d 1062 (1973);
Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich.
23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d
826 (1971); Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field Services, Inc., 650 P.2d 772 (Mont. 1982);
Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); Meistrich v. Casino Arena
Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M.
336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971); McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117
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Since a bank provides its customers with a service which it pro-
motes, which it knows to present foreseeable risks, and which is
highly profitable,2°0 the defense of assumption of risk should be
permitted only in situations of clear-cut disregard of danger by the
consumer. 202 Such a position would be in keeping with the current
provisions of the EFTA, in which the heavier burden of liability
for unauthorized transfers, despite the public's awareness of scams,
was imposed on financial institutions. 03
VI. Recommendations
This Note suggests that banks do have a duty to use reasonable
care to protect their customers from criminal attack at ATM facilities.
As between the customer and the bank, the latter is in a better
position to anticipate the risks and guard against them. °4 The pro-
posal of a set of fixed measures for banks to implement so as to
satisfy the duty of reasonable care is untenable since there are so
many variables present in the area of ATM robberies. In general,
courts should look to the likelihood of such incidents, the role of
the bank in creating the risk, and the ability of the bank to control
the premises as well as to provide for security either directly or by
contract.
The type of ATM at which the crime occurs is central to the
(1967); Hirschbach v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 206, 452 N.E.2d
326 (1983); Ritter v. Beals, 225 Or. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961); Rutter v. Northeastern
Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Farley v. M M
Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash.
2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d
63 (1963); Ford Motor Co., Inc. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963). See
generally PROSSER, supra note 29, § 68, at 493-98 (describing the trend toward
merger or abolition of assumption of risk in the United States).
201. See supra note 2 for illustrations of the considerable profitability of ATMs
to banks who install them.
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C comment j (1965).
[Clonsiderations of public policy, for the protection of particular classes
of persons against unfair or unreasonable advantage which may be taken
of them, . . . may lead to a decision that as between particular plaintiffs
and defendants, or in particular situations, implied assumption of risk
is not to be recognized as a defense.
Id.
203. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. For a thorough analysis of the
rationale supporting the imposition of a duty to protect customers on the commercial
landowner, see Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners'
Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIZ. L. REV.
727 (1979).
A TM ROBBERIES
issues of foreseeability and control.2 5 In addition, courts must define
the area of invitation when the terminal is situated outside bank
premises in order to determine whether the bank's duty to protect
extends over the scene of the crime.20 6 Moreover, the courts should
extend the bank's liability to physical as well as financial harm.2 7
Finally, if the bank raises the defense of contributory or comparative
negligence, or assumption of risk, the courts must determine whether
the plaintiff increased or voluntarily disregarded the risk.20 This
Note proposes the following guidelines20 9 with respect to these var-
iables.
A. Type of Terminal
1. On-site Vestibule Terminals21°
When a robbery occurs at an ATM situated in an internal vestibule,
principles of landowner liability apply. 21 1 The customer is a business
invitee to whom the bank owes a duty to take reasonable measures
for his protection.2 12 Since banks install the facilities, encourage
customers to use them, 2  are, or should be, aware of the risks of
criminal activity associated with them and have exclusive control
over the premises, 2 4 plaintiffs should be permitted to recover for
any harm resulting from the perpetration of criminal acts upon them
at ATMs.
2. Terminals Installed in Exterior Walls of Banks)s
At this type of terminal, the customer usually initiates his transaction
from the public street, not the bank premises. However, the bank
205. See supra notes 129-88 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 210-51 and accompanying text. All of the following proposals
are subject to the defenses of contributory or comparative negligence and assumption
of risk, where applicable.
210. See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of general
landowner liability principles.
212. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of business
invitees.
213. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of foresee-
ability.
214. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the landowner's
control of his premises.
215. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
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has created an extremely dangerous situation by electing to place
the ATM at such a vulnerable location and should be found to
have assumed the duty to reasonably protect its patrons despite the
decreased control it exercises over the area.21 6 Additionally, courts
should consider the concept extending "premises" beyond the four
walls of the business site to encompass all areas in which the plaintiff
is present to accomplish his business purpose,2t 7 as well as those
cases which discuss landowners' special uses of areas adjacent to
their premises."' If the bank has failed to provide reasonable pro-
tection, a victim of a robbery at an ATM installed in an exterior
wall of a bank should be permitted to recover in so far as it occurred
within an area reasonably within the bank's control. 1 9
3. Terminals Situated at Locations Removed from
Bank Branches20
Some ATMs situated at remote locations are self-contained units
placed at street corners and other highly-trafficked public areas;
others are situated on business premises such as grocery stores and
shopping centers.22" ' Some terminals are owned by the banks; others
belong to the owners of the premises on which they are installed. 22
At all such terminals, the element of direct control by the bank is
virtually eliminated, but the risk of criminal activity is generally
high. Although it often would be burdensome to require banks to
protect their customers at these sites, it would be inequitable to free
banks from responsibility, since they created the risks223 and profit
from the use of these terminals.224
When the ATM is located in a public place, this Note recommends
that liability for loss due to theft be attributed to the bank, despite
its inability to supervise the site and to prevent such incidents. Such
strict liability may be premised on the fact that the bank has created
an environment which it knows poses an unreasonable risk of criminal
attack to its customers by providing access to money at exposed,
unsupervised locations. 25
216. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 159.
222. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 2.
225. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that "[o]ne who carries on
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At ATMs situated on other business premises, the site owner is
the party responsible for exercising reasonable care to protect its
business visitors from criminal acts of third persons 2 6 Nevertheless,
the bank, by contracting to install its own terminal on the premises
or to gain access to the landowner's terminal, exposes its patrons
to a risk of robbery. In short, this Note proposes that under these
circumstances, the bank may be liable if it failed to use reasonable
care to protect its patrons.227 To protect itself from liability, the
bank may contract with the owner of the premises, thereby obtaining
indemnity in the event that it is found liable.
4. Terminals Shared by a Network of Banks228
Any of the aforementioned types of terminals may also be involved
in a network arrangement whereby the funds of all member banks
can be accessed through each individual participant's terminal.229
Unless otherwise provided for by the network participants, this Note
proposes the following methods for determining the duty to protect
and the liability for loss in the event of theft.
If a customer of X Bank is robbed after making a withdrawal
at a terminal located on Y Bank's premises, since X Bank is re-
sponsible for exposing its depositor to this dangerous situation and
Y Bank is responsible for the lack of security on its premises, both
an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person ...
of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care
to prevent the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(l) (1965). In de-
termining that the defendant has engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity,
some of the following factors must be present:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person ...
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965).
With respect to the operation of ATMs in public areas, factors (a), (c), (e) and
(f) are particularly applicable.
226. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of general
landowner liability principles.
227. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
229. For a description of the manner in which an ATM network operates, see
supra note 132.
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should be held accountable for the loss. 30 If the ATM is not located
on any member bank's premises, but on other business premises,
the network participants should contract with the landowner for
security. If they fail to do so, the owner of the premises and the
bank in which the victim is a depositor should be jointly liable."'
Finally, where a network facility is situated in a public place, liability
should be attributed to the bank at which the victim is a depositor
since there is no business relationship, and hence no duty, between
the other member banks and the victim.
B. Area of Invitation232
To determine the boundaries within which the bank will be held
to the duty of reasonable care, the area of invitation must be
defined. 33 At on-site terminals,23 4 the area should encompass the
entire vestibule since the customer has a right to expect that bank
premises afford him a secure environment in which to conduct his
financial business. At exterior and off-site ATMs,235 the boundaries
should extend only around the area in which the customer must be
present to complete his banking transaction. At the point of com-
pletion, control shifts from the bank to the customer and the bank
can no longer be expected to protect him.236
Defining the scope of invitation will always be a question of fact.
The factfinder should apply a flexible standard which takes into
account certain variables including, but not limited to:
(1) the distance between the terminal and the plaintiff at the time
of the theft. If he still had been in contact with the terminal,
he clearly had not completed his transaction. If he had stepped
away from the terminal when accosted, a finding that the customer
had accomplished his business might be appropriate.
(2) the time that had elapsed between the moment the patron
230. The liability of X Bank would be premised on the principles enunciated in
the discussion of bank liability for injuries sustained by customers at remotely
situated terminals. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text. The accountability
of Y Bank, on the other hand, is rooted in general landowner liability principles
as stated under the section discussing liability at on-site ATMs. See supra notes
133-58 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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removed the money and the moment he was robbed. The shorter
the time lapse, the more likely the transaction was still in progress.
(3) the degree of control that the plaintiff had exercised over the
money. If he had been in the process of removing it from the
machine, the transaction was incomplete. Once the money had
been placed in the plaintiff's pocket or wallet, the transaction
was terminated. The act of counting the money withdrawn, so
long as it is not extended, should be included within the trans-
action.
C. Scope of Injury-"
This Note proposes that plaintiffs be permitted to recover for all
injuries which are reasonably foreseeable consequences of ATM use.
Where there is easy access to cash, with minimal risk of apprehension,
thefts and acts of violence which are employed to perpetrate thefts
are likely to occur.238 A customer may be severely beaten by a thief
who steals only twenty dollars but had sought to obtain more. It
would be unfair to limit the plaintiff's recovery to the amount of
his financial loss when it was the expectation of greater profit which
lured the thief to the ATM and led to the plaintiff's injury. The
policy reasons underlying the courts' denial of recovery for physical
injury in bank robbery cases 39 are inapplicable in cases of ATM
theft,2 40 and therefore, recovery for both physical and financial harm
should be permitted.
D. Contributory and Comparative Negligence and
Assumption of Risk 241
There may be instances where the bank was unquestionably neg-
ligent, but the plaintiff acted in such a manner that he either increased
the risk or proceeded to encounter an identified danger. Depending
on the circumstances, such a finding will result in a reduction, or
perhaps a preclusion, of the plaintiff's recovery.
42
237. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 6.
239. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text for discussion of the in-
applicability of these rationales to cases involving criminal activity at ATMs.
241. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
242. In most cases, contributory or comparative negligence will not be a defense
to strict liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1965). Therefore,
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To determine whether the plaintiff was either contributorily or
comparatively negligent or had assumed the risk, courts should
consider: (1) the character of the neighborhood; (2) the time of day
at which the transaction was made; (3) the presence or absence of
any suspicious persons in the vicinity when the plaintiff approached
the terminal; (4) the amount of money withdrawn; (5) whether the
plaintiff acted in an ostentatious manner; and (6) whether publicized
incidents had previously occurred at the terminal or at nearby fa-
cilities. For assumption of risk, courts must find more than a general
awareness on the plaintiff's part sufficient for a finding of con-
tributory or comparative negligence.2 4a The defendant must establish
that the plaintiff comprehended that he was taking a risk with respect
to one or more of the factors listed above and willingly proceeded
to initiate the transaction. 2"
E. Consumer Protection and Cost Considerations
Finally, this Note proposes that courts approach cases involving
robberies at ATMs in the spirit of consumer protection manifested
by the liability provisions in the EFTA and the Truth in Lending
Act.2 45 In particular, the limitations on consumer liability which
apply to cases of unauthorized transfers2 46 demonstrate that the bulk
of liability for losses associated with electronic fund transfer systems
should remain with the bank, the party who created the risks and
is in the best position to remedy them.2 47 Furthermore, the recent
amendment to Regulation E241 to include forced initiation within the
definition of an unauthorized transfer evinces a willingness to extend
protection to consumers who are victims of crime at ATM terminals.
It seems logical to extend this favorable posture one step further
to include recovery by victims of ATM theft.
It must be noted, however, that imposing liability on banks would
have negative repercussions as well. The expense of installing and
maintaining additional security devices or hiring security guards would
since this Note recommends strict liability in cases where the terminal is operated
in a public area, the guidelines with respect to contributory and comparative
negligence will not apply where such a terminal is involved. Assumption of risk,
however, remains a viable defense in strict liability claims. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 523 (1965).
243. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 128.
246. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
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surely be passed on to the public. 249 Bank liability could result in
a cutback in services, banks choosing to cut costs by operating fewer
terminals at reduced hours. 20 The cost of procuring liability insurance
would be passed on to consumers as well. These increased costs
would no doubt result in ATM user fees, which certain banks have
already implemented for some types of ATM service.25" ' Nevertheless,
some increased cost would be acceptable if accompanied by greater
consumer security and enhanced integrity of ATM systems as a
whole.
VII. Conclusion
As society moves further into the banking age, electronic banking
facilities will continue to proliferate. Financial services will proceed
to shift from the confines of the "brick and mortar" branch to
the bustle of every street corner. The trade-off for increased banking
convenience should not be decreased security. Courts should stress
the goals of consumer protection and integrity of electronic fund
transfer systems by imposing a duty upon the banks to provide
reasonable protection for their customers against criminal attack at
ATM facilities.
Joan Miles
249. For example, the costs banks have incurred in complying with the regulatory
provisions under the Truth in Lending Act have been passed on to consumers in
the form of annual credit card user fees. See Humes, EFT and the Consumer: An
Agenda for Research, in COMPUTERS AND BANKING: ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY 61 (K. Colton and K. Kraemer eds. 1980).
250. Id.
251. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1985, at 32, col. 1.
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